Questions about what is going on at the National Intelligence Office of Inspector General
Yesterday, June 5, 2025, the Washington Post reported that “Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard installed one of her top advisers to a position within the office of the inspector general of the intelligence community, according to two U.S. officials familiar with the matter.” The Post notes that “the move potentially compromises the integrity of the independent watchdog office while it is investigating the use of the Signal messaging app by top government officials to discuss classified details of a pending U.S. military strike against the Houthis in March.”
ChatGPT satirical image, not an actual photo of Tulsi Gabbard. Please read my AI disclosure statement.
It’s important to recall that Trump’s first impeachment was based on facts in a whistleblower report that the IC IG sent to Congress. This report shows how Trump attempted to export Ukrainian President Zelensky: negative information about Joe Biden in exchange for military aid. Trump later removed the inspector general of the intelligence community who sent this report to Congress, so this entire office likely has a target on its back.
According to the Washington Post, the individual placed within the IC IG was a Trump Administration advisor in Trump’s first term, a Project 2025 contributor, and a member of the Trump transition team. Yeah, the presence of this person within the IC IG is alarming. Babysitter, mole, flying monkey. You pick your term.
The Washington Post credits its knowledge of this situation to a letter from Representative Stephen Lynch to the Intelligence Community Inspector General. For whatever reason, the Washington Post did not link to the Lynch letter, but Lynch posted it to his website. After reading the article and the law, a few things caught my eye about this situation. I know nothing other than what I read in The Washington Post and Lynch’s letters, but the following is my identification of possible issues and questions.
In analyzing the legal issues, it is important to recognize that the Office of Inspector General of the intelligence community (IC IG) is not subject to the regular Inspector General Act and all of its protections and procedures. The IC IG was established by and is governed by a separate law (50 U.S.C. 3033). Some provisions are the same as the IG Act, but some are different. It is unusual, but not unheard of, for an IG office to be outside the regular IG Act to deal with the particular issues associated with intelligence, military affairs, or separation of powers issues. The CIA and legislative branch IGs (Library of Congress, Government Printing Office, Architect of the Capitol, Capitol Police) also operate under separate statutes. In addition, there are separate statutes for “special inspectors general” for theaters of war (“contingency operations,” such as Iraq and Afghanistan) and most recently for COVID-19 pandemic relief funds. See Congressional Research Service report R45450, Statutory Inspectors General in the Federal Government, updated November 13, 2023, for information.
The situation is far worse than The Washington Post article suggests. In addition to the placement of a DNI loyalist within the IG ranks, the Lynch letter states:
The Committee has also learned that ODNI last month placed the IC IG’s Acting General Counsel on involuntary administrative leave as she was working to address independence issues between the ODNI and the IC IG. We further understand that ODNI intended for this newly appointed “senior advisor” to assume the duties previously held by the IC IG’s Acting General Counsel.
So not only is there a flying monkey within the IC IG, but this person is intended to “assume the duties” of the counsel to the IC IG, who was put on administrative leave while battling with the agency on some “independence issue.” "Independence issues” between the main agency and the IG’s office relate to access to agency records, initiation of an audit or investigation, the availability of agency personnel to sit for interviews, or a myriad of other things. Independence in personnel matters is a common issue. The independence issue with DNI may have been specifically about agency flying monkeys being installed at the IC IG.
What does the law say about the selection of staff at the IC IG? Can the Director of National Intelligence impose her person over the will of the IC IG? The IC IG statute is similar to the IG Act, but is different to account for the unique challenges of intelligence work. Under 50 U.S.C. 3303(j)(2):
Subject to applicable law and the policies of the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General shall select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions, powers, and duties of the Inspector General. The Inspector General shall ensure that any officer or employee so selected, appointed, or employed has security clearances appropriate for the assigned duties of such officer or employee.
The clause “subject to applicable law and the policies of the Director” is not in the IG Act. It has been in the CIA’s mini-IG Act. On its face, this means that the IC IG (including the acting IC IG who currently runs the office) chooses who joins the office subject to the law and agency policies. Perhaps the Director of National Intelligence created new “policies” governing appointments to the IC IG’s office specifically or did not carve out the IC IG from an agency-wide policy. Perhaps that was the “independence” issue that the general counsel for the IC IG was dealing with before being put on involuntary administrative leave. Or perhaps there is no legal basis at all.
I also note that the Lynch letter does not say the the agency figure would be the “acting general counsel” of the IC IG, but would only “assume the duties of” the acting general counsel. In the 2008 Inspector General Reform Act, Congress required each IG to “obtain legal advice” from a counsel who reported to the IG or any other IG. (Previously, some IG offices relied on their agency’s office of general counsel for legal advice, which Congress and others saw this as a threat to IG independence). When the IC IG statute was passed in 2010, Congress adopted similar language. Under the IC IG statute:
“The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who shall report to the Inspector General; or obtain the services of a counsel appointed by and directly reporting to another inspector general or the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency on a reimbursable basis.”
Representative Lynch has asked the IC IG a number of questions, including “whether any legal authority exists for the purported appointment of the “senior advisor” within the office of the IC IG, and if so, identify any such authority. Other questions relate to the duties, placement, and supervisory responsibilities. I could see the Administration arguing that the DNI official could lawfully hold a “senior advisor” or other generic while supervising the IC IG’s legal office. This would plainly be against the spirit of the IC IG mini-IG Act, but the spirit of the law does not always carry the day. This isn’t even an issue that anyone can likely challenge in court.
Another issue is the way this situation wound its way to Lynch, who leads the Democratic minority on the Oversight Committee. According to Lynch, he was “notified” by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE). CIGIE is a federal government entity that consists of IGs from across the federal government as well as heads of related federal agencies such as the Office of Special Counsel and Office of Government Ethics. It is highly unlikely that CIGIE did not also inform the Republican majority, and both sides on the Senate oversight committee. But why would Lynch not have heard from the IC IG directly?
The answer likely lies within the IC IG statute.
In the event that the Inspector General is unable to resolve any differences with the Director affecting the execution of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General…the Inspector General shall immediately notify, and submit a report to, the congressional intelligence committees on such matter.
If the facts in the Lynch letter are remotely correct, the IC IG should have “immediately notified” the congressional intelligence committees. It should also “submit a report” to the congressional intelligence committees. It is unclear whether there has been a notification or report to the intelligence committees, if a report in process, if there is a classified report, or if the agency is stalling the production of this report on classification or other grounds. The Lynch letter does not say, which is one way to deal with classified information.
In any event, informing the Oversight committees via CIGIE is not a proper substitute for the acting IC IG’s statutory obligation to notify and report to the intelligence committees. The intelligence committees have a better chance of resolving this the more politicized House Oversight committee. They control intelligence appointments, have better contacts, and in general have better leverage. Plus, if an IG cannot faithfully report to Congress about interference in its internal affairs, the objectivity of its reports and investigations is subject to question. The acting IC IG is under a statutory obligation to record her written recitation of the facts and circumstances surrounding these events, not through third-parties and not through oral or summary briefings. A failure to properly notify Congress is not just a procedural violation; it's evidence that the IC IG's independence may already be compromised. When an IG office cannot, or will not, exercise its only authority - issuing reports to Congress - it suggests the interference has already achieved its intended effect. Hopefully it will come out that IC IG has notified and reported this matter to the intelligence committees.